The Domestic Gold Purchase Programme of the Bank of Ghana recorded a net loss of GH¢9.05 billion in 2025, marking a deepening setback compared to a loss of GH¢5.66 billion in 2024, according to the Bank’s latest financial report.
The result reflects combined losses from both the gold-for-reserves operations and the gold-for-oil component, which together weighed heavily on the programme’s overall performance despite higher trading volumes and active market participation during the year.
Rising activity, widening losses
In 2025, the central bank significantly expanded its participation in the domestic gold market, purchasing 2,914,305 fine ounces of doré gold, more than double the 1,092,492 ounces acquired in 2024.
However, sales also surged to 2,895,426 fine ounces, compared to 1,076,125 ounces in the previous year.
Despite this increased turnover, the programme still ended the year with only a marginal rise in closing holdings, which stood at 9,283 fine ounces, up from 7,311 fine ounces in 2024.
The Bank explained that the financial outcome was driven by the difference between sale proceeds and the carrying value of gold sold, adjusted for directly attributable transaction costs and interest earned on gold deposits.
Gold operations drive core losses
The core gold-for-reserves segment recorded a significant net loss, contributing heavily to the overall GH¢9.05 billion deficit. The loss reflected unfavourable pricing dynamics at the point of sale relative to acquisition costs, despite increased market activity.
Although the Bank earned GH¢0.047 billion in interest income on gold deposits, this was not sufficient to offset the broader trading losses recorded during the year.
Gold-for-oil programme under pressure
The gold-for-oil component also remained a drag on performance. The segment posted a net loss of GH¢0.544 billion in 2025, an improvement from the GH¢0.667 billion loss recorded in 2024, but still firmly negative.
This loss was partially offset by gains in oil trading activities, which generated a net profit of GH¢0.341 billion, reversing a sharp loss of GH¢1.155 billion in the previous year.
Despite the recovery in oil trading, the combined effect of both gold and oil operations still resulted in a net negative position for the programme.
Market pricing and operational costs
According to the report, the financial outcome reflected prevailing international market prices at the point of sale, with results calculated based on sale proceeds net of selling costs compared to acquisition costs of gold disposed of.
The Bank noted that the overall performance also incorporated operational costs associated with managing both gold and oil transactions, particularly in support of foreign exchange management and energy supply objectives.
Programme discontinued amid reassessment
The report further confirmed that the Domestic Gold Purchase Programme was discontinued in March 2025, signalling a policy shift following years of heavy intervention in commodity markets.
The exit from the programme suggests a reassessment of its cost-effectiveness and its impact on the central bank’s broader balance sheet, especially as losses continued to accumulate despite increased transaction volumes.
Policy tool with mixed outcomes
Initially introduced as a mechanism to strengthen reserves, support foreign exchange stability, and enhance domestic value retention from gold production, the programme became a key pillar of the central bank’s commodity-based policy framework.
However, the 2025 results highlight the challenges of sustaining such interventions in volatile global markets, where price movements, operational costs, and timing of transactions can significantly influence financial outcomes.
The GH¢9.05 billion loss underscores the tension between policy objectives and financial performance, raising questions about the long-term viability of large-scale commodity trading programmes as tools of macroeconomic management.
Despite BoG reporting significant losses from its Domestic Gold Purchase Programme in 2025, the broader global gold market delivered one of its strongest performances in decades, raising fresh questions about valuation timing, policy execution, and the central bank’s strategic positioning in a surging commodity cycle.
The contrast is striking. While BoG’s gold-related operations weighed on its balance sheet, global mining giants and financial markets recorded exceptional gains driven by a historic rally in gold prices.
Global gold boom lifts miners to record profits
The price of gold surged by about 60% in 2025, rising from US$2,624 per ounce at the end of 2024 to US$4,325 by December 31, 2025, before extending further gains into 2026.
By February 25, 2026, gold was trading at US$5,199 per troy ounce, after touching an all-time high of US$5,602 on January 28.
This unprecedented rally translated into windfall earnings for major global producers.
AngloGold Ashanti reported a net profit of US$3.17 billion in 2025, up sharply from US$1.05 billion the previous year.
Newmont more than doubled its earnings, posting a US$7.1 billion profit, supported by strong cash flows and elevated bullion prices.
Similarly, Gold Fields recorded a dramatic jump in profitability, with earnings rising to US$3.5 billion in 2025, compared to just US$1.2 billion in 2024.
The broader equity markets also reflected the global commodity and risk-on sentiment, with the S&P 500 rising nearly 18% in 2025, underscoring strong investor appetite across both mining and non-mining sectors.
Contrasting outcomes for Ghana’s central bank
Against this backdrop of booming commodity prices and surging corporate profits, the Bank of Ghana’s reported losses from its gold-related programmes have stood out as an anomaly in the global cycle.
While global miners benefited directly from higher realised prices, the central bank’s results reflect a combination of accounting treatment, timing of transactions, and policy-driven operations under its DGPP.
Launched on 17 June 2021, the DGPP was designed as a strategic response to Ghana’s macroeconomic vulnerabilities, including depleted foreign exchange buffers, currency pressures, and weak external confidence.
The programme was intended to strengthen reserve management, enhance external buffers, and support exchange rate stability.
How the gold programme works
Under the framework, the Bank of Ghana acquires gold through three main channels.
It purchases refined gold from mining companies at London Bullion Market Association (LBMA)-certified refineries, placing some holdings with international bullion banks as part of reserve management.
It also buys doré gold from approved aggregators for shipment to LBMA-certified refineries, where selected quantities are refined into monetary gold.
In addition, the Bank sources gold from artisanal and small-scale miners through the Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod), with exports used mainly for foreign exchange intermediation.
Collectively, these operations have significantly expanded Ghana’s domestic gold monetisation strategy and reduced reliance on foreign exchange markets.
Strengthening reserves, easing currency pressure
Despite the financial losses reported in 2025, the programme has played a central role in stabilising Ghana’s external position.
By purchasing gold domestically, the Bank has been able to build reserves without directly competing in the foreign exchange market, thereby easing pressure on the cedi.
The conversion of gold into monetary reserves has also improved reserve adequacy and enhanced the Bank’s ability to intervene during periods of currency stress.
In addition, the programme has supported reserve diversification and reduced dependence on traditional foreign currency assets.
According to the central bank, these structural benefits have helped moderate exchange rate volatility and strengthen confidence in Ghana’s external policy framework.
A tale of timing and policy trade-offs
However, the divergence between global gains and the Bank’s reported losses highlights a deeper issue of timing and valuation. While mining companies benefited from selling gold directly into a rising market, the Bank’s role as both buyer, holder, and policy actor means its gains and losses are shaped not only by price movements but also by accounting treatment and intervention timing.
In essence, Ghana’s central bank has operated more as a stabilisation agent than a profit-maximising commodity trader—absorbing costs in the short term in pursuit of broader macroeconomic objectives.
As global gold prices continue to climb and markets remain buoyant, the contrast between private-sector windfalls and central bank balance sheet pressures is likely to remain a central theme in debates over Ghana’s gold strategy and its long-term economic trade-offs.
